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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The in pari delicto defense denies recovery to an individual
who participated in the wrong for which he seeks redress.1 Al-
though courts have applied the in pari delicto defense to claims
arising in many substantive areas of law, the analytical foundation
that courts established in contract cases remains viable. This ana-
lytical framework rests upon the premise that an individual who
participates in an illegal activity should not receive judicial relief
for injuries he suffered as a result of that activity. Courts, however,
recognize four exceptions to that analysis which allow wrongdoers
to recover for their injuries: (1) the plaintiff acted under fraud or
duress; (2) the plaintiff is a member of the class of people the law
seeks to protect by making the transaction illegal; (3) the plaintiff
did not know that the transaction was illegal or participated in an
independent wrong; (4) the denial of relief to the plaintiff is unjust
or against public policy. 2 Courts consider the fourth exception to
be residual in nature and often use it to promote statutory goals.
In securities law, defendants have raised in pari delicto as a
defense to many claims, such as violations of the registration, mar-
gin, and proxy provisions and of rule 10b-5.3 If a tippee4 sues a
tipper under rule 10b-5 to recover losses he sustained by trading
securities on inside information 5 that the tipper6 gave him, the tip-
per probably will assert the in pari delicto defense. A typical sce-
nario begins when a broker passes inside information about a se-
curity to a client. The client buys the security, knowing that its
purchase on the basis of inside information violates rule 10b-5.7
1. See Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1156-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 965 (1977).
2. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 63-148 and accompanying text.
4. A tippee is a person who (1) receives inside information; (2) "knows or should know
that the information is nonpublic"; (3) did not receive the information in his business ca-
pacity or for a legitimate business purpose; and (4) knows or should know that he obtained
the information improperly. 5 A. JACoBs, THE IMPACT OF RuLE 10B-5 § 66.02 (1974).
5. Inside information consists of "nonpublic facts concerning the business of an issuer,
one of its securities, or the market for its securities," that the issuer intends to be available
only for a business purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone trading in its securi-
ties. Id.
6. A tipper is a person who possesses material inside information and selectively dis-
closes that information for securities trading or other personal gain. Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1154
n.1; Grumet v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336, 339-41 (D.N.J. 1983).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). See infra note 101 for text of rule 10b-5. "Rule 10b-5
has become the kernel of all antifraud actions brought either privately or by the S.E.C."
Glickman, "Tippee" Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 20 U. KAN. L. REv. 47, 47 n.4 (1971).
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The value of the stock declines and the investor brings suit against
the broker to recoup his losses. The broker then raises the in par!
delicto defense, contending that the court should deny recovery
because the investor knowingly participated in the illegal securities
purchase.
To determine whether the in pari delicto defense bars tippee
recovery in 10b-5 cases, most courts implicitly apply the analytical
framework that earlier courts derived from the application of the
defense in contract cases.8 Courts properly deny the defense and
allow recovery in private 10b-5 cases when the plaintiff qualifies
under one of the first three exceptions to the framework.9 In an
increasing number of cases, however, the courts must base their
decisions on the" fourth, residual exception because the first three
exceptions do not apply.10 The residual exception denies the in
pari delicto defense when necessary to promote the public policies
underlying rule 10b-5. Because the goals of the federal securities
laws and the best way to achieve them are unsettled, the federal
circuit courts disagree over whether the residual exception pros-
cribes a 10b-5 defendant from raising the in pari delicto defense.
One line of authority in the circuits permits the tippee to recover
from the tipper those losses that he sustained while trading securi-
ties in violations of rule 10b-5.11 These courts view the tipper as
the "fountainhead" of the inside information and seek to discour-
Rule 10b-5 requires an insider or a tippee either to disclose material inside information
before trading in or recommending the purchase or sale of a security, or to abstain from
trading in or recommending the security. Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1161; 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note
4, at § 66.02. In cases in which tippees sue because they lost money by trading on inside
information that proved false, the courts have rejected the tippees' argument that they are
not true tippees because the inside information was not material. The courts reason that no
difference exists between a fraud and an attempted fraud. Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1159-60;
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969). See also SEC v. Lund, 570 F.
Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (disallowing the tippee's recovery because, although the tippee
breached no legal duty to those from whom he purchased the securities, he was a "tempo-
rary insider" subject to liability under 10b-5 for personally trading on nonpublic material
information he received as an officer of a company with which the issuer was doing busi-
ness). But cf. Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678, 691 (11th
Cir. 1983) (allowing an investor who traded on inside information to recover from his bro-
ker, the tipper, because the investor owed no duty to those from whom he purchased the
securities and, therefore, did not engage in an unlawful activity).
8. See infra notes 96-148 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 96.
10. See, e.g., James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974); Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). See infra notes 103-48 and accompanying text.
11. See Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451 (D.D.C. 1979); Na-
thanson, 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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age him from passing inside information by holding him liable for
the tippee's losses.12 Other circuit courts permit tippers to use the
in pari delicto defense in private 10b-5 actions, reasoning that the
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) enforcement pow-
ers13 provide adequate incentive to discourage the tipper from dis-
seminating inside information. 14 These courts also fear that deny-
ing the in pari delicto defense would insulate tippees from the risk
of loss inherent in all securities trading.15
This Note advocates that courts should permit tipper defen-
dants to assert the in pari delicto defense in private 10b-5 cases
against tippee plaintiffs unless one of the first three exceptions to
the analytical framework applies. Part II of this Note discusses the
purpose and application of the in pari delicto defense and the four
situations in which courts have rejected it. Part II also illustrates
how courts analyze the in pari delicto defense in contract, anti-
trust, and non-10b-5 securities cases. Part III provides a general
background on the purpose of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 and rule 10b-5, and analyzes the current split among federal
circuit courts on the application of the in pari delicto defense in
rule 10b-5 actions. Part IV concludes that courts should leave the
parties to the illegal agreements undisturbed and should not apply
the residual exception to disallow the defense in 10b-5 actions.
When one of the first three exceptions to the defense does apply,
however, courts should continue to allow plaintiff tippees to re-
cover against tipper defendants who have given the tippees false
inside information.
12. Nathanson, 325 F. Supp. at 57. See Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp.
427, 434 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451 (D.D.C.
1979); In re Haven Industries, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
13. Congress created the SEC in 1934 by enacting the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE WORK OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (1980) reprinted in L. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION: A PROBLEM AP-
PROACH 4 (1982). Through the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC is given the power
to investigate possible violations of the securities laws. The Commission's investigations
generally arise from unusual price movements on the securities exchanges and routine in-
spections of broker-dealers, not from disappointed investor complaints. The SEC may then
recommend that the Department of Justice prosecute the alleged violator, or the SEC may
bring an injunctive action in the appropriate district court to enjoin violations of the federal
securities laws. H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1980 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 24.01 (1980). See also
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (The SEC "is provided with an arse-
nal of flexible enforcement powers.").
14. Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1164; Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705; Grumet, 564 F. Supp. at 339.
15. Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1163-64; Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705; Grumet, 564 F. Supp. 339.
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II. THE In Pari Delicto DEFENSE IN NON-10B-5 CASES
In pari delicto means "of equal fault."1 The in pari delicto
defense arose from the equitable maxim that one who seeks equita-
ble relief must come into court with "clean hands.' 17 Courts apply
the doctrine to deny relief to claimants who participated in the
wrongs for which they seek recovery.'8 The courts offer three ra-
tionale for the defense. First, since both parties are "equally at
fault," the courts do not want to reward one party by allowing him
to profit by the illegal act.19 Second, courts feel that denying recov-
ery will deter future illegal conduct.20 Finally, the in pari delicto
defense publicly affirms the court's dissatisfaction with the plain-
tiff's conduct.2 '
Judicial decisions first established a framework for applying
the in pari delicto defense in the contract setting. Since that time,
courts have developed four exceptions that do not allow defen-
dants to assert the defense. Courts apply the general contract rule
and the four exception analysis to a wide range of claims, including
securities and antitrust cases.
A. The Contract Cases
The in pari delicto defense originated in contract law. The
general rule is that courts do not recognize rights arising from ille-
gal agreements,22 but, rather, consider the agreements void and
16. Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968).
17. The equitable maxim provides that courts will not intervene on behalf of a plain-
tiff whose prior conduct evidences bad faith or a lack of conscience. Keystone Driller Co. v.
General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1933); 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §
397 (5th ed. 1941). Courts have distinguished between in pan delicto in an action at law for
damages and the doctrine of "unclean hands," which denies equitable relief to a party en-
gaging in misconduct. See, e.g., Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1156-57 n.9.
18. See 3 J. PomHRoY, EQurrY JuiuspRuDNcz § 940 (5th ed. 1941).
19. See Zytka v. Dmochowski, 302 Mass. 63, 18 N.E.2d 332 (1938); Seitz v. Michel, 148
Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102 (1921).
20. See, e.g., Thacher Hotel, Inc. v. Economos, 160 Me. 22, 25, 197 A.2d 59, 61 (1964).
21. See Roberts v. Criss, 266 F. 296, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1920); Keene Syndicate v. Wichita
Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 69 Kan. 284, 76 P. 834 (1904); Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W.
102 (1921).
22. Standard Lumber Co. v. Butler Ice Co., 146 F. 359, 362 (3d Cir. 1906) ("The
poison of the immoral consideration infects the contract as a whole, and the court below
were [sic] right in refusing to lend its aid to the enforcement of any part thereof."). Ordina-
rily, no party may claim rights arising from an illegal contract. Priller v. Auglaize Hotel Co.,
34 Ohio L. Abs. 287, 290, 36 N.E.2d 1019, 1021-22 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941). Third parties may
raise the agreement's illegality when a party asserts a claim based on the agreement against
them. Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 117 Tenn. 263, 98 S.W. 178 (1906).
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leave the parties as the courts find them.23 The rationale for the
rule is twofold. First, courts should not render judgments that vali-
date illegal acts.24 Second, courts should discourage illegal and cor-
rupt contracts by refusing to aid parties to illegal agreements.25
Courts recognize four situations in which they will not allow
defendants to hide behind the in pari delicto defense: (1) the de-
fendant used fraud or duress to induce the plaintiff to participate
in the illegal act; (2) the plaintiff is in the class of people the law
seeks to protect by making the activity illegal; (3) the plaintiff did
not know that the activity was illegal or participated in an inde-
pendent wrong; and (4) the denial of relief to the plaintiff would be
unjust or against public policy.
1. Fraud or Duress
Courts allow the in pari delicto defense only when the parties
are of equal fault and, therefore, will not allow its use when the
defendant is guilty of inducing the plaintiff to participate in the
illegal activity by fraud or duress. The fraud or duress exception
frequently arises in the business context when one party to a
transaction enjoys greater bargaining power than the other party.
26
Courts also commonly employ this exception when a confidential
relationship exists between the two parties, thereby making the
imposition of coercion or duress more likely.27 Some courts even
23. Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash. 2d 630, 636-37, 409 P.2d
160, 164 (1965) (the court "leaves the parties where it finds them whether or not the situa-
tion is unequal as to the parties" in an action to recover on an illegal contract); Keene v.
Harling, 36 Cal. Rptr. 98, 104-05 (1963), vacated, 61 Cal. 2d 318, 392 P.2d 273, 38 Cal. Rptr.
513 (1964).
24. Edwards v. Goldsboro, 141 N.C. 60, 53 S.E. 652 (1906).
25. Keene v. Harling, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 104; Edwards v. Goldsboro, 141 N.C. at 65, 53
S.E. at 653. See also Thacher Hotel, Inc. v. Economos, 160 Me. 22, 25, 197 A.2d 59, 61
(1964) (The court should not be concerned with its "conception of fairness between parties."
The law is designed to deter people from entering into illegal contracts. It is not designed to
protect either of the parties which have entered into an illegal agreement); Reagan v. Union
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555, 76 N.E. 217 (1905) (A court should never sanction a
contract which may endanger the public interest or which may be detrimental to the public
good.) (quoting Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 154 (1898)).
26. See Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F. Supp. 1276
(W.D. Okla. 1982), modified, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), in which the plaintiffs alleged
that the National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) control over scheduling the tele-
vising of college football games violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. The NCAA raised the
in pari delicto defense, explaining that the plaintiffs had participated voluntarily in the
challenged agreements. The court denied the defense, concluding that the NCAA had
greater bargaining power than the plaintiffs in television scheduling, and that the case was a
classic example of "economic coercion." Id. at 1324.
27. See National Bank & Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189 U.S. 423 (1903); Gardine v. Cottey,
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presume duress or undue influence when a confidential relation-
ship exists.2"
2. Law Designed to Protect the Plaintiff
When the activity violates a law intended to protect a class of
which the plaintiff is a member, courts generally will not allow the
defendant to assert the in pari delicto defense. In one case, for
example, the plaintiff voluntarily participated in an illegal boxing
match and sued the promoter to recover for his injuries."' The
court held that the defendant could not assert as a defense the
plaintiff's violation of the boxing statute because the legislature
passed the statute to protect people, like the plaintiff, who may
not appreciate the consequences of their action.30 This exception
also applies when the statute that makes the activity illegal im-
poses a penalty upon only one party to the activity.31
3. Plaintiff Did Not Know of Illegality or Participated in
Independent Wrong
The third exception precludes the in pari delicto defense
when a plaintiff did not know he was engaging in an illegal activ-
ity, or when he engaged in an illegal activity independent of the
wrong for which he seeks redress. Courts derive these exceptions
from the premise that they should allow the in pari delicto defense
only if the parties are of equal fault in the transaction.32 A defend-
ant, therefore, may not assert the defense unless the plaintiff's
wrongful conduct arose from the illegal transaction with the de-
fendant.8 s Even if both parties participated in the same illegal
360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731 (1950) (husband's attorney induced wife to enter void property
settlement); MacRackan v. Bank of Columbus, 164 N.C. 24, 28, 80 S.E. 184, 185 (1913) (The
parties are not of equal fault when one party is in a position to dictate and the other party
must submit.).
28. See DURESS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE, §§ 29, 30 (Rev. ed. 1968).
29. Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal. 2d 654, 204 P.2d 1 (1949).
30. Hudson, 33 Cal. 2d at 660, 204 P.2d at 4.
31. Prior to 1970, the federal margin statute made the extension of unauthorized
credit by brokers criminal, but did not make investor acceptance of such credit illegal.
Courts rarely applied the in pari delicto defense under this statute. See, e.g., Pearlstein v.
Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
32. Graham v. Dean, 144 Tex. 61, 188 S.W.2d 372 (1945); Oakes v. Guarantee Ins. Co.,
573 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Western Nat'l Bank, Denton v. King, 547 S.W.2d
734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
33. In Phenix Ins. Co. v. Clay, 101 Ga. 331, 28 S.E. 853 (1897), a landlord knowingly
and unlawfully leased an apartment to a prostitute. When the premises burned down, the
landlord's insurance company tried to avoid payment by asserting that the landlord used
19841
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transaction, the defendant must show that the plaintiff was aware
of its illegality."
4. Residual: Public Policy and Statutory Goals
If the first three exceptions are not available, courts often use
a fourth, residual exception when they feel obliged to deny the in
pari delicto defense to promote public policy and statutory goals.
Courts using the fourth exception attempt to ascertain the legisla-
tive intent behind the violated statute and the most appropriate
manner of promoting the statute's goals.3 5 Statutes, however, often
have many goals" and courts, therefore, often face the difficult
task of choosing between those goals in particular cases to deter-
mine whether the denial of the in pari delicto defense is in the
public's best interest.3 7 Likewise, although courts readily agree that
they should use the in pari delicto defense and this fourth excep-
tion to deter future illegal conduct,38 courts often find it difficult in
particular factual settings to determine whether denying the de-
fense will deter or encourage future violations.3 "
B. Antitrust
Courts generally deny the in pari delicto defense in antitrust
actions, implicitly applying the in pari delicto contract analysis.
the premises illegally. The court denied the defense, finding that the illegal activity was
independent of the insurance contract. See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (independent violations of the same act do not support the in
pan delicto defense).
34. See, e.g., Oakes, 573 S.W.2d at 902 (although contract between insurance company
and agent was void due to agent's violations of state law, agent could not raise the in pari
delicto defense because the insurance company was unaware of the violations); Roylex, Inc.
v. Avco Community Developers, Inc., 559 S.W.2d 833, 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (allowing
plaintiff to recover because he was unaware of facts making the transaction illegal); King,
547 S.W.2d 734 (parties not at equal fault when only one party knew of illegality).
35. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-
39 (1968); Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D.
Conn. 1977).
36. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971) (majority felt margin laws protected investors, while dissent be-
lieved margin statutes regulated nation's credit).
37. See, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1969); infra
notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1163 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705, 706 (the majority found that allowing the in
pari delicto defense best deters illegal conduct, while the dissent contended that denying
the defense would discourage illegal behavior).
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The United States Supreme Court rejected the defense in Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,40 an antitrust case
on which courts frequently rely to deny use of in pari delicto in
other substantive legal areas."'
The petitioners in Perma Life, former Midas Muffler dealers,
contended that Midas restrained and substantially lessened com-
petition in violation of the Sherman Act42 and the Clayton Act 43 by
requiring each Midas dealer to sign an allegedly abusive sales
agreement. The sales agreements barred the dealers from purchas-
ing from other sources of supply, prohibited them from selling
outside their designated territory,44 and required them to sell Mi-
das products at fixed retail prices. 5 The petitioners challenged the
agreements despite their enthusiastic attempts to acquire addi-
tional Midas franchises with full knowledge of the provisions of the
agreement, and despite the enormous profits which they made as
Midas dealers. 48 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the in pari delicto defense barred petition-
ers' claims.47 The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion that relied
on the rationale underlying the exceptions to the defense which
courts developed in contract law, although the Court did not adopt
expressly the contract framework.
Justice Black's majority opinion implicitly applied the first
contract exception, emphasizing the parties' unequal bargaining
power as a ground for rejecting the in pari delicto defense. 48 He
40. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
41. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970) (vio-
lation of SEC margin requirements), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Moholt v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451, 452 (D.D.C. 1979) (insider trading); Nathanson v.
Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (insider trading).
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). Petitioners alleged a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits "contract[s] ... in restraint of trade." Id. § 1.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982). Petitioners alleged a violation of § 14 of the Clayton
Act, which prohibits sale of goods contracts that substantially lessen trade by providing that
the purchaser may not deal in the goods of the seller's competitors. Id. § 14.
44. Justice Marshall suggested that this provision might actually benefit the plaintiffs
by restricting competition between franchisees. Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 149 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
45. Id. at 136-37.
46. Id. at 138.
47. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1967), reversed, 392 U.S. 134 (1968). The court stated that it would be difficult to find a case
which was more suitable to the application of the in pari delicto defense. Id. at 699. Each of
the plaintiffs voluntarily entered into each of the franchise agreements and each of the
plaintiffs had the right to abandon his agreement. Id. The plaintiffs, moreover, sought dam-
ages because they were denied additional franchises. Id.
48. Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 140-41.
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noted that even though the dealers sought the Midas franchises
enthusiastically, they did not seek actively each clause in the sales
agreements.49 The majority felt that the petitioners accepted many
of the agreements' restraints solely "to obtain an otherwise attrac-
tive business opportunity. '50 In his concurring opinion, Justice
White agreed that the plaintiffs did not enter the agreements vol-
untarily.51 He found that the defendant had used its market power
and leverage to "thrust" the agreements upon the plaintiffs.2
The Perma Life Court also implicitly applied the second con-
tract exception to deny the in pari delicto defense, finding that the
petitioners were members of the class that Congress sought to pro-
tect when it enacted the antitrust laws.5 3 Justice Fortas, concurring
with the majority, explained that Congress designed the antitrust
laws to protect individuals from unfair business agreements when
the agreements are the only feasible way the individual may con-
duct business.
54
The Perma Life majority also implicitly applied the fourth,
residual contract exception, which seeks to promote public policy
and statutory goals, and concluded that denying the defense would
serve antitrust policies more efficiently.5  The Court indicated that
the antitrust laws do not reflect a congressional intent to recognize
49. Id. at 139.
50. Id. Some commentators have criticized the Court for finding that the plaintiffs
entered into the agreements involuntarily merely because some of the clauses were not in
their best interest. See, e.g., Comment, Antitrust-Franchise Agreement - In Pari Delicto
Held not a Defense in an Action by Franchisee Against Franchisor, 14 N.Y.L.F. 658, 665
(1968) ("Four franchisees are allowed to collect treble damages, notwithstanding the fact
that they voluntarily and knowingly enter the program, expand and profit in the program
... , and provide to the consumer a quality muffler accompanied by an extraordinary war-
ranty."). The agreements did not require the plaintiffs to pay a franchise fee, which may
suggest that the plaintiffs willingly agreed to the restrictions. Indeed, most contracts contain
clauses that are desirable to one party but not to the other. Taken to its logical conclusion,
Justice Black's assertion would leave gifts as the only truly voluntary transactions.
51. Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 143 (White, J., concurring).
52. Id. Justice White provided the following list of considerations for determining
whether the parties to an illegal agreement are equally at fault:
[Tihe relative responsibility for originating, negotiating, and implementing the scheme;
...who might reasonably have been expected to benefit from the provision or conduct
making the scheme illegal... ;. . .whether one party attempted to terminate the
arrangement and encountered resistance or counter-measures from the other; [and]
who ultimately profited or suffered from the arrangement.
Id. at 146-47.
53. Id. at 139 ("the law encourages his suit").
54. Id. at 148 (Fortas, J., concurring) (quoting Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 653 (2d
Cir. 1945)).
55. Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 138-39.
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the in pari delicto defense in treble damage antitrust actions.58
The Court noted that by providing successful plaintiffs with treble
damage awards, Congress insured that private suits would be an
ever-present deterrent to anyone contemplating business behavior
in contravention of antitrust law.57 The Perma Life Court felt that
even if the plaintiff was as "morally reprehensible" as the defend-
ant, the plaintiff should recover treble damages to "further the
overriding public policy in favor of competition.
'5 8
Although the Supreme Court in Perma Life denied the appli-
cation of the in pari delicto defense in an antitrust action, it ex-
plicitly did not circumscribe the defense's viability in other set-
tings.59 Moreover, Justice Fortas, concurring, emphasized that
courts should not allow plaintiffs in antitrust actions to recover
damages for any clause that the plaintiff initially desired and
originated.60 The separate concurring opinions of Justices White
and Marshall expressed the view that if the defendant proved that
the plaintiff participated in the formulation of the entire agree-
ment by negotiating each clause, the plaintiff should not recover.6
Occasionally, courts improperly rely on Perma Life for the broad
proposition that defendants may not raise the in pari delicto de-
fense in any setting.62 The Court based its denial of the in pari
delicto defense in Perma Life, however, on the narrow grounds of
the unequal bargaining power of the parties, the statute's specific
purpose of protecting the plaintiff's class, and the statute's unique
treble damage provision.
56. Id. at 138.
57. Id. at 139.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 140.
60. Id. at 148.
61. Id. at 146, 150.
62. The Court in Perma Life broadly stated that "the doctrine of in pari delicto...
is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action." Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 140.
Some courts have used this broad statement to generally deny the in pari delicto defense.
See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980) (Supreme Court has not
displayed much enthusiasm for the in pari delicto defense to claims for violation of federal
statutes); Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977) (trial





1. Sales of Unregistered Securities
Courts also have considered the availability of the in pari
delicto defense in actions arising from sales of unregistered securi-
ties. The Securities Act of 193363 contains registration provisions 64
which protect investors by insuring that adequate, accurate infor-
mation about securities is available to the general public.6 5 Courts
generally do not recognize the in pari delicto defense in cases of
registration violations.
When the average investor conducts securities transactions, he
generally is exempt from the registration requirements of the 1933
Act. 6 The investor, however, will lose his registration exemption
and be subject to civil liability if he buys unregistered securities
with a "view towards distribution. 6 7 Despite this illegality, courts
have been reluctant to hold those investors in pari delicto with the
parties who sold them the unregistered securities. In Can-Am Pe-
troleum Co. v. Beck,6 8 an investor purchased unregistered securi-
ties from the Can-Am Company and later sued the company for
securities registration violations when the securities declined in
value. The company raised the in pari delicto defense, contending
that the plaintiff also violated the 1933 Act by actively selling the
unregistered securities to other investors."" The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disallowed the defense,
finding that the plaintiff had not violated the 1933 Act because she
63. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982).
64. A detailed examination of the registration requirements of the 1933 Act exceeds
the scope of this Note. Generally, however, § 5(c) of the 1933 Act makes it unlawful for any
person to offer or sell a security unless the issuer has filed a registration statement for the
transaction. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1982). If, however, either the security or the transaction
qualifies for an exemption under §§ 3 or 4, the security is not subject to the 1933 Act's
registration provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1982). See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SEcuarEs REGULATION 297-440 (1983) (examination of the exemptions available under §§ 3
and 4).
65. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957) ("A basic purpose of the
Securities Act of 1933.... is to require the dissemination of adequate and accurate informa-
tion concerning issuers and their securities in connection with the offer and sale of securities
to the public.").
66. Section 4(1) of the 1933 Act exempts transactions by persons other than issuers,
underwriters, and dealers. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1982). The typical investor does not fall
within the definitions of issuer, underwriter, or dealer in § 2(4), (11) or (12) of the 1933 Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4), (11), (12) (1982). See generally, L. Loss, supra note 64, at 400-01.
67. In this situation the investor qualifies as an underwriter, thereby losing his § 4(1)
exemption. See L. Loss, supra note 64, at 400.
68. 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964).
69. Id. at 374.
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did not participate in the entire distribution scheme, but had made
only isolated sales. 0 In a similar case, 1 a court found that, al-
though the plaintiff had sold unregistered securities illegally, pub-
lic policy considerations permitted him to recover from the parties
who sold him the unregistered securities.72
2. Margin Violations
When courts consider whether to permit a defendant to raise
the in pari delicto defense in a margin violation case, they con-
front a statutory scheme similar to rule 10b-5. Congress enacted
the federal margin statutes primarily to prevent a recurrence of
the stock market crash of 19297' by combating the common desire
of investors to speculate unwisely on credit.74 Section 7(c) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 7 empowers the Federal Reserve
Board to regulate the amount of credit that securities purchasers
may receive. 8 Pursuant to this authority, the Board has enacted
several regulations to restrict brokers, dealers,77 and banks7 8 from
70. Id.
71. Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978).
72. Id. at 1293-94. The Lawler court stated that private suits were essential to the
effective enforcement of the registration requirements. Id. at 1293.
73. Although they disagree about the purposes of the margin requirements, see L.
Loss, supra note 64, at 718-19, currently most courts believe that the statutes serve a credit
regulatory function. See, e.g., Gilman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 660 F.2d 688, 692 (6th
Cir. 1981). The House report on H.R. 9323 supports this view.
The main purpose [of the margin provisions] is to give a government credit agency an
effective method of reducing the aggregate amount of the nation's credit resources
which can be directed by speculation in the stock market and out of other more desira-
ble uses of commerce and industry-to prevent a recurrence of the pre-crash situation
where funds which would otherwise be available at normal interest rates for uses of
local commerce, industry and agriculture were drained by far higher rates into security
loans and the New York call market.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), quoted in Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677, 678-79 (D.D.C. 1971).
74. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied
401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1982).
76. Section 7(c) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities exchange or any broker or
dealer, directly or indirectly, to extend or maintain credit or arrange for the extension
or maintenance of credit to or for any customer-(1) on any security (other than an
exempted security), in contravention of the rules and regulations which the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall prescribe under . . . this section[.]
Id.
77. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(2) (1983), promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
78g(a) (1982), governs broker and dealer credit extensions. It reads in relevant part:
In case a customer purchases a security (other than an exempted security) in the
special cash account and does not make full cash payment for the security within 7
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extending excessive credit to investors.
The margin statutes originally made it illegal for brokers to
extend excessive credit, but did not subject the customers to liabil-
ity for accepting the credit.79 As a result, most courts refused to
allow a broker to raise the in pari delicto defense when an investor
sued to recover losses that he sustained while trading on unautho-
rized credit.8 0 The courts reasoned that it was unfair to apply the
defense against an investor who had not engaged in illegal con-
duct. 1 Some courts also reasoned that Congress enacted the mar-
gin laws to protect investors and, therefore, plaintiff investors
came within the second exception to the in pari delicto defense.
8 2
In 1970 Congress amended the margin statutes to make ac-
ceptance by investors of unlawful credit extensions illegal.83 Since
this statutory change, the majority of courts have held that inves-
tors no longer have a private cause of action against their brokers
under section 7.84 These courts emphasize that the legislative in-
tent behind the 1970 amendments to section 7 is to tighten control
on national credit policy by holding investors as well as lenders
days after the date on which the security is so purchased, the creditor shall, except as
provided in paragraphs (c)(3) through (7) of this section, promptly cancel or otherwise
liquidate the transaction or the unsettled portion thereof.
78. Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.3(t) (1983), controls bank credit extensions.
79. See Pearlstein, 429 F.2d at 1141. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities exchange or any broker
or dealer, directly or indirectly, to extend or maintain credit or arrange for the exten-
sion or maintenance of credit to or for any customer...
(1) on any security (other than an exempted security), in contravention of the
rules and regulations which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem shall prescribe under subsections (a) and (b) of this section[.]
80. See, e.g., Pearlstein, 429 F.2d at 1136; Avery, 328 F. Supp. at 677; Zatz v. Hertz,
Neumark & Warner, 262 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see Serzysko v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 904 (1969). (allowing the in pari delicto defense in a margin violation case because
bank did not know that the borrower used the money to purchase securities).
81. See, e.g., Avery, 328 F. Supp. at 680.
82. See, e.g., Zatz, 262 F. Supp. at 930-31. Indeed, the Senate Banking & Currency
Committee Report provides that one purpose of the margin provision is "to protect the
margin purchaser by making it impossible for him to buy securities on too thin a margin."
STOCK EXcHANGE PRACTICEs, REPORT OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. REP.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1934). See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the second exception to the in pari delicto defense.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1983) makes it unlawful for any person to obtain an extension
of credit that violates the margin statutes.
84. See, e.g., Gilman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 660 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1981); Gut-
ter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d
1073 (4th Cir. 1979); Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977).
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accountable. 5 These courts, therefore, hold that an investor who
has violated section 7 has no cause of action under section 7
against the lender."' A few courts, however, emphasize that an an-
cillary purpose of the margin statutes is to protect private inves-
tors. 8 7 These courts permit a good faith investor who unknowingly
has violated section 7(c) to maintain an action against his broker,
but allow the broker to assert the in pari delicto defense. 8 No
courts permit a party who knowingly has violated the margin stat-
utes to maintain an action against his broker, dealer, or banker for
a margin infraction. This result is in sharp contrast to rule 10b-5
cases, in which courts often permit a party who has violated the
rule to maintain a 10b-5 action. 9
3. Proxy Violations
The SEC designed the proxy provisions in Securities Ex-
change Act Rule 14(a)90 to ensure complete and accurate disclosure
during proxy solicitations.9 1 Courts generally have recognized the
availability of the in pari delicto defense in proxy violation cases.
In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Com-
mittee,92 a group of disgruntled shareholders engaged in a proxy
fight with the company management in an attempt to gain control
of the corporation. Management brought an action against the
shareholders alleging federal proxy violations. The United States
District Court for the District of Delaware found that both sides
85. See, e.g., Stern, 603 F.2d at 1084.
86. Id. The courts rely on the test outlined in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), to
determine whether a private cause of action will exist for the plaintiff. Gilman, 660 F.2d at
692. In the typical margin violation case the courts will not recognize a private cause of
action because the plaintiff/borrower is not one "for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted" and Congress did not intend to provide a remedy for borrowers. See Gilman, 660
F.2d at 692-93 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78 with emphasis in original); Gutter, 644
F.2d at 119; Stern, 603 F.2d at 1081; Utah State Univ., 549 F.2d at 169-70.
87. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 921
(D. Conn. 1977).
88. Id. at 921-22.
89. See infra notes 103-17 and accompanying text. Courts have denied the in pari
delicto defense when a corporation sues its former officers or directors for perpetrating a
fraud against the corporation. See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Rosen v. Dick, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 94,786, at 96,602 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1974). The courts reason that
the defendant was guilty of fraud (exception 1), or that the corporation was not a knowing
party to the fraud (exception 3). See Hooper, 282 F.2d at 208.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982).
91. See L. Loss, supra note 64, at 512-18.
92. 354 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1973).
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willfully had violated rule 14(a) and the court, therefore, refused to
grant relief to either party.93 The shareholders contended that the
court should grant them relief because management's misconduct
was more severe than the shareholder's violations.94 The court re-
jected this argument, stating that when both parties willfully vio-
late federal securities laws, the court will not weigh the severity of
one party's misconduct against the other's, but will deny relief and
leave the parties as the court finds them."
III. APPLICATION OF THE In Pari Delicto DEFENSE IN 1OB-5 CASES
A. The Goals of Rule 10b-5
Courts implicitly apply the in pari delicto analysis when a tip-
pee sues a tipper under rule 10b-5 to recover for a decline in the
value of securities that he purchased pursuant to the tipper's in-
side information. In many of these 10b-5 actions, one of the first
three exceptions to the in pari delicto defense applies and the
courts prohibit the tippers from raising the defense.98 Frequently,
however, the first three exceptions are inapplicable and the court
must determine whether the residual exception requires the court
to deny the defense. Because the residual exception seeks to ad-
vance statutory goals, the policies underlying rule 10b-5 are of cru-
cial importance in that determination.
93. The Chris-Craft court found management guilty of making false and material mis-
statements in violation of rule 14a-9 and the shareholders guilty of violating rule 14a-11(c),
which requires disclosure of the names of participants in the proxy solicitation.
94. Chris-Craft, 354 F. Supp. at 922.
95. Id. Other courts have relied on a similar doctrine, the doctrine of unclean hands,
to deny relief in proxy violation suits. See, e.g., King v. Edwards, 559 F. Supp. 75, 88 (N.D.
Ga. 1982) ("The [unclean hands] doctrine is applicable in a private lawsuit for the violation
of proxy regulations where the party seeking relief is also guilty of wrongdoing in the proxy
contest."); Blanchette v. Providence & Worcester Co., 428 F. Supp. 347, 357 (D. Del. 1977)
(The court recognized the application of the unclean hands doctrine in those cases where
the one seeking relief is "guilty of a violation involving the transaction in litigation."); Aster
v. BP Oil Corp., 412 F. Supp. 179, 190 (M.D. Pa. 1976) ("Except in extraordinary circum-
stances, a party seeking equitable remedies who has not acted in 'good faith' will be denied
relief.") (citations omitted), afl'd without an opinion, 549 F.2d 794 (3rd Cir. 1977).
96. See, e.g., Berner v. Lazzaro, No. 83-1972 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 1984) (securities profes-
sionals and corporate officers who engaged in fraud not allowed to invoke in pari delicto
defense to escape liability to their tippees); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136,
1141 (2d Cir. 1970) (in pan delicto does not apply when violated margin statute imposed
penalty only upon creditor), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647,
652 (2d Cir. 1945) (when party acts under duress of another, the parties are not in pari
delicto); Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451, 453 (D.D.C. 1979)
("[B]roker ... cannot be said to be equally at fault with his receptive but duped investors
...."); Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (lack of knowledge).
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" prohib-
its any person who buys or sells securities from using deceptive or
manipulative devices that contravene SEC rules whose purpose is
to protect the investing public.98 Although the congressional intent
behind the adoption of section 10(b) is unclear,s9 the provision ex-
pressly empowers the SEC to adopt rules that protect investors
and promote the public interest.100 Pursuant to this broad author-
ity the SEC adopted rule 10b-5 to prevent fraud by any person in
the purchase or sale of securities. 101 Courts have advanced several
policies in support of rule 10b-5, including: the protection of inves-
tors; assurance of fairness in securities trading; deterrence of secur-
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1983).
98. Id. Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
Id.
99. Scant legislative history accompanies the enactment of § 10. The House Report
states:
The House bill.. . and the Senate amendment contain similar provisions regulating
the use of manipulative devices, except that the Senate amendment contains a provi-
sion prohibiting the use or employment in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance "which the Commission
may declare to be detrimental to the interests of investors." The substitute includes
this provision of the Senate amendment with the modification that it is made unlawful
to use or employ any such device or contrivance "in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."
H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934). See generally 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note
4, at § 5.01 (legislative background to § 10(b)).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1983); see supra note 98 for the relevant text of the provision.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Id. Prior to the enactment of rule 10b-5 the securities statutes prohibited fraud only in the
sale of securities. See Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1982). The SEC was
powerless to punish fraud in connection with the purchase of securities.
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ities violations; compensation for victims; and disclosure of infor-
mation relevant to securities transactions.102 Courts seek to
promote these rule 10b-5 goals when they determine whether to
apply the residual exception to the in pari delicto defense.
B. 10b-5 Cases Denying the In Pari Delicto Defense
Several courts have prohibited tipper defendants from raising
the in pari delicto defense in private 10b-5 cases. 103 In Nathanson
v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,04 the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York discussed several of the ju-
dicial rationale that deny use of the defense in rule 10b-5 cases.
The defendant in Nathanson, a securities brokerage firm, per-
suaded the plaintiffs to purchase securities of the target company
in a merger agreement by informing them that the target company
planned to exchange its stock valued at eight dollars per share for
stock valued at seventeen dollars per share.'0 5 The plaintiffs suf-
fered a substantial loss when the merger took place at a much
lower exchange rate than they expected.0 6 Plaintiffs brought suit
charging defendants with several federal securities law viola-
tions,0 7 and claiming damages under rule 10b-5. The defendants
raised the in pari delicto defense, arguing that the plaintiffs
should not recover because they violated rule 10b-5 by purchasing
securities on the basis of material inside information. 08 The court
denied the in pari delicto defense because allowing the plaintiffs to
recover would serve more effectively the policies underlying rule
lob-5. 09
The Nathanson court implicitly applied the residual exception
102. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48, 855, 858, 860 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub noma. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See generally 5 A.
JACOBS, supra note 4, at §§ 6.01-.09 (outlining eight policies behind rule 10b-5).
103. See, e.g., Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451 (D.D.C. 1979);
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The Supreme
Court consistently has affirmed the right of individuals to bring private suits under rule
10b-5 and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30
(1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
104. 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
105. Id. at 51.
106. Id. at 52.
107. Id. at 51. In addition to rule 10b-5, plaintiffs charged the defendants with violat-
ing §§ 12 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 and § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
108. 325 F. Supp. at 52.
109. Id. at 53.
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to the in pari delicto defense, explaining that the securities laws
not only prevent fraud, manipulation, and deception, but also seek
to compel insiders to adhere to their duty of publicly disclosing
material inside information before trading upon it. 110 The court
supported its holding with several express rationale. First, the
court noted that courts have disallowed the in pari delicto defense
in antitrust cases, such as Perma Life."' The court conceded, how-
ever, that significant differences exist between the antitrust stat-
utes, which clearly manifest congressional intent to secure private
enforcement by providing treble damage awards, and rule 10b-5,
which does not contain an analogous provision."
2
Second, the Nathanson court found that the broker-the tip-
per-and the investors-the tippees-were not equally at fault be-
cause the broker's misconduct presented a greater potential threat
to the investing public. 13 Although the court recognized that the
tippees were in a position to take advantage of innocent investors,
it felt that the broker posed a much greater threat to the public
because he was the "fountainhead" of the confidential
information." 4
Third, the court reasoned that denying the defense would en-
courage tippee suits and, thereby, deter brokers from passing in-
side information." 5 The court conceded that allowing tippees to
recover might indemnify them against trading losses,"l6 but felt
that the threat of private suits was a beneficial supplement to the
SEC's enforcement powers.
110. Id. at 53-54.
111. Id. at 56; see supra notes 40-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Perma Life decision.
112. 325 F. Supp. at 56. The court offered no rationale for its reliance on Perma Life
notwithstanding these differences. In a footnote, however, the court argued that the securi-
ties laws are similar to the antitrust laws in that both have similar policies underlying the
private enforcement of the statutes. Id. at 56 n.30. But see Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703 ("In
private SEC violations [sic] the degree of public interest is not comparable to that made
apparent by the triple damage provision; we see no sufficient public interest when the only
question is one of accounting between joint conspirators.")
113. 325 F. Supp. at 57; see Moholt, 478 F. Supp. at 453 ("The broker-dealer as tipper
presents a greater threat than the customer-tippee to the integrity of the regulatory frame-
work that prohibits trading on material inside information.").
114. 325 F. Supp. at 57.
115. Id. at 56-57.
116. Id. at 55 n.26.
117. Id. at 57 (citing Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971)).
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C. 10b-5 Cases Allowing the In Pari Delicto Defense
Several courts have held that allowing the in pari delicto de-
fense in private 10b-5 cases better promotes the goals of rule 10b-
5. In Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,118 for example, the defendant tip-
per persuaded the plaintiff tippee to purchase stock on the basis of
inside information. The inside information proved false and the
plaintiff sued the tipper to recover his investment. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit implicitly applied an
in pari delicto analysis,"19 held that plaintiff's 10b-5 violations put
him in pari delicto with the defendant, and barred recovery.
The Kuehnert majority recognized the general rule that a
plaintiff's illegal conduct should preclude recovery. 20 The court
then considered several of the traditional exceptions justifying de-
nial of the in pari delicto defense and rejected them based on the
facts in the case. The majority found irrelevant evidence that de-
fendant originated the illegal scheme, and concluded that plaintiff
was equally at fault because he willingly entered into an illegal ac-
tivity that was potentially profitable for both parties.' 2 ' The court
noted that plaintiff's voluntary participation in the transactions
prevented him from claiming that defendant coerced him with eco-
nomic duress or that plaintiff had mere knowledge of the illegality
of the scheme and did not participate actively.'22
The Kuehnert court finally based its holding on the residual
exception to the in pari delicto defense,'23 stating that availability
of the defense lies in the court's discretion. 24 The court noted that
the plaintiff sought to defraud innocent investors-the class of
people Congress intended to protect by enacting rule 10b-
118. 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
119. Id. at 703. The court stated that "[t]he guiding principle [in determining whether
to allow recovery] is one of policy."
Courts claim to apply only a two part test. To satisfy the two part test the plaintiff
must be substantially equal in fault with the defendant and the application of the defense
cannot adversely affect the enforcement of the statutory scheme. Grumet v. Shearson/Amer-
ican Exp., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D.N.J. 1983).
120. Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 703-04. Other courts require the plaintiff's active participation to deny the
defense in 10b-5 cases. See, e.g., James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1974);
Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 138 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2nd Cir. 1976).
123. Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 704.
124. Id. The court stated that the "question must be one of policy which decision will
have the better consequences in promoting the objective of the securities laws by increasing
the protection to be afforded the investing public." Id.
576 [Vol. 37:557
RULE 10b-5
512 5-and rejected plaintiff's argument that, because the deal
failed, they did not harm any innocent investors.1 26 The court
found no substantive difference between a successful and an at-
tempted fraud,127 and reasoned that the plaintiff had a statutory
duty to disclose inside information before trading on it, and that
the plaintiff contributed to his loss by failing to fulfill that obliga-
tion. 1 28 The majority also feared that if it denied the defense then
the tipper would receive an enforceable warranty against securities
trading losses when trading on inside information.1 2 Such a war-
ranty would ensure that an investor could not lose money as a tip-
pee because he could recover his loss from the tipper if the inside
information proves false, and normally would realize a gain in the
market if the inside information is true. In addition, although most
tippees theoretically are liable under rule lOb-5, is° the difficulty of
tracing them often affords tippees practical immunity from liabil-
ity.131 The court also found denial of the defense necessary to deter
tippees from trading on inside information because the illegal
transactions of both tippers and tippees threaten the investing
public.23 2 The majority conceded that denying the defense would
reduce the deterrence against becoming a tipper, but noted that
SEC enforcement powers already provide a sufficient disincentive
to potential tippers contemplating passing inside information.'
The Kuehnert majority concluded that its role was not to serve as
a referee between guilty parties and, therefore, that it should let
the plaintiff's loss lie where it fell.3
A dissenting opinion in Kuehnert noted that neither the SEC
rules nor the securities statutes provide for the in pari delicto doc-
trine in private 10b-5 actions.'3 5 The dissent also relied on Perma
Life ' 6 for the proposition that the in pari delicto defense had lost
125. Id.; see Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Natl Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1162 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).
126. Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 704.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 704; see Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1162.
129. Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705; see Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1163-64; In re Haven Indus.,
Inc., 462 F. Supp. 172, 179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705).
130. See supra note 7.
131. Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705; see In re Haven, 462 F. Supp. at 180.
132. Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705.
133. Id. at 705; see Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1164; In re Haven, 462 F. Supp. at 180. For a
discussion of the SEC's enforcement powers, see supra note 13.
134. Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705.
135. Id. (Godbold, J., dissenting).
136. 392 U.S. 134 (1968); see supra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.
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viability in other legal areas. 13 7 The dissent's principal disagree-
ment with the majority, however, was that private tippee suits
would provide needed deterrence against tippers who represent the
first step in the dissemination of inside information."3 8
In Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank,39 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also held that the defend-
ant in a private 10b-5 case could assert the in pari delicto de-
fense. 40 The court noted that the investor plaintiff's conduct was
active and voluntary, obviating the Perma Life Court's' 4 ' concern
that denying the use of the defense against plaintiffs whose partici-
-pation was active or coerced would be unfair.142 Like the Kuehnert
majority, the Tarasi court relied on the residual exception to allow
the defense. The court stated that the plaintiff's illegal actions not
only had contributed significantly to his losses, but that they also
presented a serious threat to the investing public.143 The court ac-
knowledged that denying the defense would deter tippers who de-
liberately pass false information, 44 but questioned the deterrent
effect on tippers who believe their inside information is true. 45 Be-
cause proof of scienter is a prerequisite to recovery in a private
10b-5 suit, 46 the court doubted whether the threat of tippee suits
would deter potential tippers.147 Moreover, because tippee suits are
relatively rare, the court felt that the optimum solution would be
to rely on potential SEC penalties to dissuade tippers and to pro-
vide tippees with a disincentive to trade on inside information by
denying them a cause of action against their tippers.
48
137. Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705.
138. Id. at 706.
139. 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir. 1977).
140. In Tarasi, a group of disappointed investors sued their banker because they lost
money after purchasing securities on the basis of the banker's inside information.
141. 392 U.S. 134 (1968); see supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
142. Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1162.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1163.
145. Id.
146. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). "There is no indication
that Congress intended anyone to be made liable... unless he acted other than in good
faith." Id. at 206.
147. Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1163. The court's doubt presumably arose because the plain-
tiff would have to demonstrate that the tipper knowingly gave out false information con-
cerning the transaction in question.




In many recent 10b-5 cases, courts have not allowed defen-
dants to raise the in pari delicto defense. In several of these cases,
courts properly have denied the in pari delicto defense on the
ground that one or more of the first three exceptions to the defense
was available. ' 9 Although courts have had difficulty determining
whether to apply one of the first three exceptions to deny the de-
fense, the goals underlying the defense and its exceptions are rela-
tively clear.
When the first three exceptions are not available, however,
courts must rely on the fourth, residual exception to the defense51°
to determine whether a tippee may recoup his losses from a tipper.
Courts employ the residual exception to deny the in pari delicto
defense when the interests of public policy and statutory goals so
dictate. Given the divergence of opinion concerning the goals of
10b-5 and the best method to promote those goals, courts disagree
on whether to employ the residual exception to allow a tippee, who
has engaged knowingly in illegal behavior, to recover from his
tipper.
The Nathanson court 5' most effectively articulated the judi-
cial rationale that preclude defendants from asserting the in pari
delicto defense in private 10b-5 actions. Although the Nathanson
court recognized that significant differences exist between antitrust
and rule 10b-5 cases, the court relied on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Perma Life51 to deny the defense in a private 10b-5 ac-
tion.15 Other courts have relied on Perma Life in 10b-5 cases to an
even greater extent than did the Nathanson court,154 even though
a close examination of the Perma Life holding reveals almost no
support for an analogy between antitrust and 10b-5 legal princi-
ples. As the Nathanson court noted, the Supreme Court based its
Perma Life holding on the unequal bargaining power of the par-
ties.' 5 The plaintiffs in Nathanson, however, voluntarily pur-
149. See supra note 96. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the first three exceptions to the in pari delicto defense.
150. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fourth,
residual exception to the in pari delicto defense.
151. Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see
supra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
152. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); see
supra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.
153. Nathanson, 325 F. Supp. at 56.
154. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
155. Nathanson, 325 F. Supp. at 56; see Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
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chased the securities in violation of the securities laws.150 Indeed,
economic duress is unlikely to be an element in a 10b-5 insider
trading action because the plaintiff probably cannot establish a
credible claim that the tipper coerced him into entering the illegal
securities transaction. 157 The Nathanson court also recognized that
the antitrust laws differ substantially from rule 10b-5 because they
provide for a private treble damage action, a provision which
clearly manifests a congressional intent to secure private enforce-
ment of antitrust law.158 In contrast, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
does not indicate that Congress intended to provide guilty parties
with a private cause of action under the statute. 15 9 The Nathanson
court also reasoned that courts more effectively could promote the
fundamental purpose of rule lOb-5-ensuring "that all investors
. . . have relatively equal access to material information" 160 -by
allowing tippees to recover from tippers. The court viewed the tip-
per as the greater potential threat to public investors because he
was the fountainhead of the inside information. 61 To protect in-
vestors, the Nathanson court advocated stopping inside informa-
tion at its source by providing tippees with an incentive to sue
tippers.
16 2
Courts that allow the in pari delicto defense in private 10b-5
cases, such as the Fifth Circuit in Kuehnert,0 5 agree that courts
should employ rule 10b-5 to prevent insider trading," but contend
that allowing the defendant to assert the defense is the most effec-
tive way to curb the flow of inside information. The Kuehnert
court's approach is more persuasive than Nathanson and its prog-
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139-41 (1968).
156. Nathanson, 325 F. Supp. at 56.
157. Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1162 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 965 (1977).
158. Nathanson, 325 F. Supp. at 56.
159. The courts, however, have implied a private cause of action under rule 10b-5. See
supra note 103. Although innocent investor suits are an important 10b-5 enforcement de-
vice, a much more troublesome situation arises when a party guilty of violating rule 10b-5
brings suit.
160. Nathanson, 325 F. Supp. at 53-54 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
161. Nathanson, 325 F. Supp. at 57.
162. Id. at 57-58. The Nathanson court also relied on Pearlstein v. Scudder & Ger-
man, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971), for the proposition
that the threat of private suits provides an important supplement to SEC actions. Nathan-
son, 325 F. Supp. at 57.
163. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1970); see supra notes 118-38
and accompanying text.
164. Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 704.
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eny. The Kuehnert majority reasoned that if it authorized tippee
suits, it would grant tippees an enforceable warranty against losses
they incur while trading on inside information.165 Congress enacted
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act to protect innocent investors, not to
create windfalls for parties who have violated the securities laws.
Moreover, the threat of SEC criminal and civil proceedings, and
potential harm to professional reputations, already provide tippers
with a substantial disincentive to disseminate inside informa-
tion."'6 In contrast, as the Kuehnert court recognized, the difficulty
of tracing tippees makes the threat to the tippee of 10b-5 liability
remote.
16 7
The Kuehnert position also finds strong support in the analy-
sis of the in pari delicto defense in the margin and proxy violation
cases.16 8 Rule 10b-5 makes it illegal for an insider to pass inside
information and requires anyone who obtains inside information
either to disclose that knowledge to the public or to refrain from
trading on it.69 Similarly, the margin statutes hold both the credi-
tor and the debtor liable for trading on excessive credit.1 0 Most
courts deny borrowers a private cause of action under the margin
statutes because they have violated the statute under which they
seek to recover,1 71 just as tippees have violated rule 10b-5. Because
the margin laws regulate borrowers, the courts reason that legisla-
tures did not enact the margin statutes for the "especial benefit"
of borrowers.17 2 Similarly, because the securities laws regulate tip-
pees, the courts should reason that legislatures did not enact the
laws governing securities trading for the especial benefit of tippees.
In addition, courts deny relief in proxy violation cases to parties
who have violated the statute under which they seek redress.17 3
A bill passed by the United States House of Representatives
and pending in the United States Senate lends additional support
to the Kuehnert court's holding that tippees may not recover in
private 10b-5 actions against tippers. House Bill 559 would in-
crease the penalties imposed on persons who trade or cause other
persons to trade on inside information relating to upcoming tender
165. Id. at 705.
166. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 7, 131 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 72-95 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 86.
173. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
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offers. 174 One variation of the bill would require persons violating
the statute to forfeit to the United States Treasury three times the
amount of their gain or the loss they avoided by trading on inside
information. 175 Although the bill would not apply to cases in which
tippees suffer trading losses and sue their tippers,'76 courts may
refer to the bill, if Congress passes it, as evidence of congressional
intent when applying the residual exception in 10b-5 cases. The
increased penalty on the tippee that the bill proposes supports the
position that rule 10b-5 seeks to protect innocent investors; it is
not designed to insure parties violating the rule against trading
losses.1
77
Courts, therefore, should not use the residual exception to per-
mit plaintiffs to recover in lob-5 tipper-tippee cases, but should
leave the parties as they find them. Although it is uncertain
whether permitting or denying the defense more successfully will
deter insider trading, the policy considerations that the Kuehnert
court advanced militate strongly against allowing the tippee to ob-
tain judicial relief. Courts long have recognized that allowing a
guilty party to recover is resorting to a fiction-a fiction that
courts should perpetuate in tipper-tippee 10b-5 cases only when
doing so will further the public policies underlying any of the first
174. H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
175. H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § (f) (1983) provides:
Any person violating this section shall forfeit the amount of his gain [or the loss
avoided] and shall pay the amount [or two or three times the amount] into the Trea-
sury of the United States upon order of a United States District Court in an action
commenced by the Commission under Section 21(a).
The bracketed parts are alternative provisions in the bill.
176. The damage provision, supra note 175, applies only if the tippee realized a gain
or avoided a loss by trading on the inside information. The bill does not apply if the tippee
sustained a loss from insider trading.
177. Because the statute imposes treble damages on tippers, some courts may attempt
improperly to analogize the bill to antitrust cases such as Perma Life. Courts in antitrust
cases have denied the defense on the ground that the treble damage provision seeks to en-
courage private causes of action, and thus courts should construe strictly impediments to
private suits. An analogy between the proposed bill and the antitrust statute is inapposite
for two reasons. First, several justices on the Perma Life Court recognized that when parties
are equally responsible for antitrust violations courts should apply the in pari delicto de-
fense to deny recovery. In the tipper-tippee situation both parties generally bear equal re-
sponsibility for the potential harm to the investing public and thus courts should not de-
prive the tipper of the benefit of the defense. The tipper obtains and passes the inside
information to the tippee who has an advantage over other investors when he trades on the
inside information. Second, the United States Treasury receives the damages under the pro-
posed bill, as opposed to an antitrust action in which the plaintiff receives the treble dam-
age award. The different damage recipients undercut any contention that Congress designed
House Bill 559 to provide tippees with an incentive to bring private 10b-5 suits against
tippers.
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three exceptions to the in pari delicto defense. Because the poli-
cies underlying rule 10b-5 are unclear, however, courts should not
rely on the residual exception to the defense to allow tippees to
recover. Judicial disagreement concerning the goals of 10b-5 is in-
dicative of the fact that this area of the law is too unsettled to
justify allowing guilty tippees to recover. The first three excep-
tions, however, serve clearly defined public policies and courts,
therefore, should continue to rely on them to permit guilty tippees
to recover in those extremely rare situations in which the excep-
tions apply.
V. CONCLUSION
The in pari delicto defense first arose in contract disputes.
Defendants since have asserted the defense in a wide variety of
situations. From this wide application, the courts have developed
four exceptions to the defense's application.
Federal circuit courts disagree over whether to allow the de-
fense to bar the recovery of a tippee against his tipper in a private
10b-5 suit, or to disallow the defense and permit recovery under
the defense's fourth, residual exception. The courts that deny the
defense reason that holding the tipper liable to his tippee for pass-
ing on inside information more effectively advances the goals of
section 10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and rule
10b-5. These courts reason that imposing liability on tippers will
deter them from disseminating inside information, and thereby re-
duce the amount of trading on inside information. The courts im-
properly analogize the 10b-5 cases to the antitrust cases, which
have allowed guilty plaintiffs to recover.
On the other hand, the courts that allow the in pari delicto
defense have concluded that denying relief to a guilty tippee more
efficiently advances the goals underlying section 10 and rule 10b-5.
These courts reason that denying tippees recovery eliminates the
warranty against loss that allowing recovery would grant tippees.
Because the courts disagree over whether allowing the defense
better effectuates the underlying policies of section 10 and rule
10b-5, the courts should grant the defense. Permitting a guilty
party to recover is resorting to a fiction. Courts should resort to
such fictions only when it clearly serves the underlying policies of
the statute. In addition, actions that tippees bring against tippers
under rule 10b-5 are analogous to cases involving margin violations
and proxy regulation violations. Decisions in both margin violation
and proxy regulation violation cases have recognized the in pari
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delicto defense and denied recovery to guilty plaintiffs. For these
two reasons, all courts should recognize the in pari delicto defense
in tippee suits against tippers under rule 10b-5.
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